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Abstract: The sharp increase in the price and production of quinoa between 
1990 and 2014 has had important impacts in Bolivia’s southern Altiplano region, 
previously considered one of the poorest regions in the country. The socio-eco-
nomic status of most inhabitants improved significantly as a result of the “quinoa 
boom”. However, it also caused severe disturbances in socio-ecological systems 
and posed challenges to resource governance by traditional indigenous institu-
tions. This article focuses on the role of farmer cooperatives, in particular, and 
examines how their production rules may have mitigated some of the challenges 
associated with the quinoa boom. We assess the activities of cooperatives with 
the help of Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) frame-
work and analytic tools such as the ADICO grammar (Attribute, Deontic, aIm, 
Condition, Or else) and the eight design principles. The key production rules of 
cooperatives are examined and compliance with these rules is estimated based 
on  semi-structured interviews and a survey conducted with quinoa producers 
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(n=305). We argue that the cooperatives successfully contributed to alleviate 
pressures on resources in a context where traditional authorities were challenged 
by new tasks associated with land grabbing and the crowding out of diversified 
agricultural activities. In conclusion, we argue that collaboration between tradi-
tional authorities and farmer cooperatives holds great potential for improving the 
governance and sustainability of socio-ecological systems in the region.
Keywords: Cooperatives, design principles, faitrade, organic production, pro-
duction norms, quinoa
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, agrarian systems worldwide have undergone important 
changes, including the rise of dominant corporate-led agro-industrial food regimes 
(Bernstein 2015) and a corresponding redefinition of farmers’ and peasants’ 
identities and livelihoods (Harriss 1982; Chatterjee 2008; van der Ploeg 2008). 
These developments have significantly increased pressure on natural resources. 
Quinoa, a pseudo-cereal and traditional staple food of Andean indigenous popula-
tions, epitomizes these trends. In recent years, quinoa has evolved from being a 
neglected traditional food to an important export crop, promoted as a “superfood” 
throughout the Western world (Nuñez de Arco 2015; Bazile et al. 2016). Rising 
demand among Western consumers has created new economic opportunities for 
quinoa farmers in Bolivia’s southern Altiplano (Laguna 2000; Kerssen 2015; 
Tschopp 2018). However, the steep rise in quinoa prices has also created new 
challenges in terms of environmental degradation, for example, manifesting as 
pesticide contamination or drastic land use change from extensively used pastures 
to intensively used agricultural land (Jacobsen 2011; Orsag et al. 2013; Walsh-
Dilley 2013; Winkel et al. 2016).
Recent research suggests that institutional interplay between traditional 
Common Pool Resource (CPR) systems in the southern Altiplano, on the one 
hand, and self-organization systems, on the other, could be key to the realization 
of socio-economic benefits from rising quinoa prices, while mitigating possible 
negative environmental impacts (Winkel et al. 2016). Given the economic impor-
tance of quinoa in the region, quinoa cooperatives and their production rules are an 
important element of the relevant CPR system. Affiliation with a quinoa coopera-
tive enables quinoa producers to obtain access to the high-price markets of organic 
and fair trade certified quinoa. To date, there has been little research on the quinoa 
boom’s effect on the dynamics of institutions governing the use of land.
Thus, the present article seeks to examine institutional governance dynam-
ics and related socio-economic and ecological outcomes triggered by the 
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 quinoa boom in the context of local CPR governance. More specifically, we 
analyse how farmer cooperatives handled compliance with international pro-
duction standards, and how this changed the dynamics of CPR governance 
of Tierras Communitarias de Origen (Native Community Lands, TCOs). We 
also investigate whether and how the resulting institutional transformations 
helped manage the strongly increased pressure on natural resources. Based on 
our results, we argue that interaction between traditional CPR institutions and 
farmer cooperatives resulted in stricter rules for quinoa production and that 
some of these rules likely mitigated possible negative impacts of the quinoa 
boom. Expanding on our empirical insights, we discuss cooperatives as an 
example of bottom-up institution building, framed as “constitutionality” by 
Haller et al. (2015).
The article is structured as follows: In the next section, we present the general 
context and our region of study. In the third section, we compare different theo-
retical perspectives to frame our case. In the fourth section, we present our results 
and analyse six production norms of quinoa cooperatives. In the fifth section, we 
discuss some of the results in light of Elinor Ostrom’s eight design principles of 
CPR management and the constitutionality framework. 
2. Geography and institutional context of the quinoa boom
Quinoa production in Bolivia was traditionally concentrated in specific regions, 
especially the southern Altiplano in the departments of Potosí and Oruro 
(Figure 1). This area is characterized by very low rainfall – between 150 and 
300 millimetres (mm) per year – saline soils, and high sun exposure, as well 
as frequent occurrence of drought and frost (Geerts et al. 2006; Pouteau et al. 
2011). Our specific study area lies in the municipalities of San Pedro de Quemes, 
Figure 1: Map of the southern Altiplano.
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Colcha K, and Tomave. These municipalities comprise more than 50 communi-
ties distributed over a large geographic area, but feature a population of fewer 
than 9000  households (see Table 1). We chose these municipalities for the present 
study because of the expressed willingness of three cooperatives present in the 
region to participate in the research and because of prior fieldwork conducted in 
this specific area.
Quinoa is the only significant cash crop that can be cultivated in this area. 
Issues of land distribution and use of natural resources must be understood in 
this context. Access to land and types of permissible land use among families 
are defined by community norms that are often formulated by the community 
as a whole during assemblies. These norms are implemented and monitored by 
various forms of traditional authorities including corregidores (“correction offi-
cers”), agentes municipales (“municipal agents”), and kuraka (“mediators”). 
In some cases, community rules have been developed and formalized with the 
support of NGOs, such as AVSF (Agronomos y veterinaries sin Frontera; see 
Argandoña Espinoza 2016). Rules regulating access to land vary according to the 
type of access and the type of land use. The most important land use types within 
communities are pasture land for collective use and “privately” used agricultural 
land. The latter is still community land, but it is reserved for a specific family 
who is given exclusive use rights (Vassas-Toral and Vieira Pak 2010; Vassas 
Toral 2011). These rights are usually passed on within families across genera-
tions; however, the land in question cannot be granted, sold, or transferred to 
anyone outside the community (Vieira Pak 2012; Kerssen 2015). Hence, while 
local pasture land use is consistent with the usual definition of CPR, land use for 
agricultural production retains features of CPR (common ownership, common 
use when fallow), but also differs in key ways (privately used on behalf of crop 
production).
The diverse stakeholders shaping land use decisions are presented in Figure 2. 
While community-level land use decisions are shaped by traditional authorities 
and cooperatives, these stakeholders are entangled in networks involving actors 
at the national and international level. In this way, the longstanding traditional 
Table 1: Basic demographic information of the study region (Source INE 2012).
Census data (from the 
year 2012)
 Colcha K  San Pedro de 
Quemes
 Tomave  Total
Total population  12,997  1060  14,789  28,846
 Incl. Men  7103 (54.65%)  568 (53.58%)  7341 (49.64%)  15,012 (52.04%)
 Women  5894 (45.35%)  492 (46.42%)  7448 (50.36%)  13,834 (47.96%)
 >18 years old  8184 (62.98%)  734 (69.25%)  9019 (60.98%)  17,937 (62.18%)
Number of households 
(Viviendas ocupadas)
3307  372  5216  8895
Poverty rate  57.1%  66.5%  76.3%  67.3%
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authority system has been increasingly caught up in a complex system of gover-
nance, faced with challenges from fluctuating quinoa markets.
2.1. The quinoa boom
Around 2007, a spectacular increase in prices marked the beginning of the 
quinoa boom. These prices initially stabilized at high levels, even reaching 
8000 USD/ton, but began falling by the end of 2014. The quinoa boom fur-
ther accelerated the mechanization of agricultural production, and prospects for 
high profits led to conversion of massive amounts of pasture land into land 
under quinoa cultivation (Vieira Pak 2012). While the land conversion phenom-
enon existed prior to the quinoa boom, it sped up markedly around 2007–2008, 
together with high prices of quinoa on international markets (Winkel et al. 2012; 
Orsag et al. 2013; Kerssen 2015). The increasing conversion of pasture land 
led to a significant decline in CPR, especially pasture areas. In some communi-
ties, this decline had dramatic effects, causing agricultural producers to aban-
don livestock keeping because of the lack of decent land for pasturing. Other 
socio-ecological consequences of the quinoa boom included further degrada-
tion of CPR due to erosion and pesticide contamination. As such, the quinoa 
boom gave rise to major challenges for the region and significantly increased 
pressure on land. The precise socio-ecological impacts of the quinoa boom are 
difficult to assess accurately and comprehensively (Vieira Pak 2012; Winkel 
et al. 2012). We have chosen to focus on land conversion from pasture to agri-
culture – which is a strong indicator of socio-ecological systems reaching their 
Figure 2: Map of stakeholders influencing land use in the region.
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 production  limits (Winkel et al. 2016) – and to examine how cooperatives may 
have helped  mitigate negative impacts.
2.2. Cooperatives as a part of the CPR governance system
Cooperatives1 have been particularly important in the development of the quinoa 
market, first by arranging quinoa exports to Peru and then to North America and 
Europe from the 1980s to today. These cooperatives also introduced various rules 
on quinoa production, mainly relating to “fair trade” and “organic” certification 
of quinoa exports, although not exclusively. Further, they developed monitoring 
mechanisms and independent controls to ensure that farmers would respect the 
rules even when market prices might tempt them to do otherwise (e.g. use of 
pesticides in case of pest infestation, side-selling, etc.). Hence, the cooperative 
model differs significantly from the other types of commercial farming in the 
sense that they are not only interested in economic profits, but also have social and 
environmental objectives. Instead of seeing a contradiction between profit and 
social goals, Fairbarn (2003) further defines the specific dual nature of coopera-
tives through relationships and linkages between a cooperative and its members. 
Fairbairn (2003) argues that cooperatives socially link members to one another, 
link the resulting group to shared economic and environmental goals, and enable 
adaptation to specific markets.
The first quinoa cooperatives emerged in Bolivia as early as 1975 with 
the creation of the Central de Cooperativas Agropecuarias Operación Tierra 
(CECAOT). This organization was originally assembled around mechanization of 
agriculture and sought to regroup producers to manage and buy important assets 
such as tractors (Laguna 2003). Today, however, these cooperatives mostly man-
age collection and transportation of quinoa from different communities, sale of 
the product to national and international buyers, as well as enforcement of the 
same set of production rules among all members. Each of these organisations 
counts between 200 and 500 members. They represent an important share of the 
quinoa producers in some local communities – as much as 80–90% in remote 
communities such as Copacabana (Nor Lipez), but much less in other communi-
ties, especially those affected by post-boom migrations. Producers who do not 
belong to a cooperative either sell their quinoa to local intermediaries or are affili-
ated with individual private firms that export quinoa on their own, sometimes also 
under organic labels. The leaders of farmer cooperatives typically claim that they 
uphold higher production standards, are less involved in agricultural expansion 
and offer producers better prices than investor-owned quinoa operations.
1
 Three organizations were used as a case study in this paper. While two of these organizations (SO-
PROQUI and ARPAIAMT) have the legal status of association and are members of the National As-
sociation of Quinoa Producers (ANAPQUI), the third one defines itself as an umbrella organization 
of several local cooperatives (CECAOT). For the sake of simplicity, we use the term “cooperative” 
for all the three organizations examined in this study.
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3. Institutional analysis of the governance of common-pool 
resources
3.1. Local level governance and Ostrom’s eight design principles
Understanding of natural resource governance took a major step forward with 
the ground-breaking work of Elinor Ostrom and others (Ostrom 1990; Dietz 
et al. 2003), who emphasized the importance of the local level in natural resource 
governance. They demonstrated that local institutional mechanisms hold greater 
potential in terms of efficacy and sustainability when compared with centralized 
governance of natural resources (Berkes 2008). Ostrom’s approach led to the cre-
ation of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 
Table 2: Design principles for community-based natural resource management (adapted from 
Ostrom 1990; Haller 2007; Cox et al. 2010).
1. Clearly defined boundaries
The boundaries of the resource system as well as the individuals or households with rights to harvest 
resource products are clearly defined.
This principle implies two specific elements:  
1A: Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the common-pool 
resource (CPR) must be clearly defined.
2A: Clearly defined boundaries: The boundaries of the CPR must be well defined.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
Rules specifying the amount of resources that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and to 
rules requiring labour, material, and/or money.
2A: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: Appropriation 
rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local 
conditions.
2B: The benefits obtained by users of a CPR, as determined by appropriation rules, are proportional 
to the amount of inputs required in the form of labour, material, or money, as determined by 
provision rules.
3. Collective choice arrangements
Most individuals affected by the appropriation rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
4. Monitoring 
Monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour are responsible for the conduct 
of the members of the system.
4A: Monitoring: Monitors are present and actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator 
behaviour.
4B: Monitoring: Monitors are accountable to or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions
Appropriators who violate rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the context of 
the offense).
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts between 
appropriators and/or between appropriators and their officials.
7. Minimum recognition of rights to organize
The right of members to devise their own institutions are not challenged by any external authority. 
8. Nested enterprises
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance mechanisms are 
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
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1990; Polski and Ostrom 1999; Ostrom 2009). In this framework, actors oper-
ate within the boundaries of an “action arena” defined by the biophysical world, 
community settings, as well as the rules in use. At the same time, institutions are 
conceptualized as boundaries or incentives that shape human initiatives, actions, 
and their outcomes (Haller 2007). 
Ostrom was particularly interested in the conditions that could contribute to 
the failure or success of local institutions in governing natural resources. Her work 
led to the formulation of eight key conditions under which CPR could be man-
aged sustainability (see Table 2). These principles have frequently been used in 
the literature on natural resource governance to assess the effectiveness and abil-
ity of an institutional system to govern natural resources sustainably (Cox 2011; 
Forsyth and Johnson 2014). More recent work tried to extend these principles to 
other fields (Wilson et al. 2013). Nevertheless, application of these principles can 
be difficult, in particular when boundaries do not fit well with Ostrom’s definition 
(Turner 1999; Quinn et al. 2007), or when multiple centres of power exist. This 
latter situation, reflecting the concept of polycentricity (Ostrom 2010; Nagendra 
and Ostrom 2012), corresponds rather well to the situation in our study region. 
Traditional authorities in the area acquired important powers following their rec-
ognition by the Bolivian state (Laguna 2011). At the same time, the  traditional 
authorities coexist alongside NGOs, state authorities and cooperatives – and all 
of these actors participate in shaping collective land use decisions in the region 
(Winkel et al. 2016). The roles of these actors will be addressed in greater detail 
in the next section. In particular, we focus on how these actors were affected by 
an exogenous shock, namely, the quinoa boom. A review conducted by Cox et al. 
(2010) concluded that the eight design principles are largely supported by the 
existing literature on CPR; they proposed a modified version of the principles that 
specifies their use and identifies several specific sub-conditions. We have opted to 
use the revised version of the principles in our analysis.
3.2. Institutional changes and constitutionality as bottom-up institution-
building processes
Nagendra and Ostrom (2012) emphasize that flexibility and adaptation of local 
institutions are usually not sufficiently taken into account in the literature on insti-
tutions and change. This observation is echoed by others: Drawing on research 
by Ensminger (1996) on institutional change, Haller and Merten (2008) stress the 
importance of the socio-political process through which institutions evolve or are 
adopted/abandoned by a community (Ensminger 1996). Ensminger focuses on 
exogenous changes such as market shocks and their effects on local institutions 
governing CPR and livelihood outcomes in developing countries. According to 
Ensminger, political, ecological, demographic, and social changes can directly or 
indirectly affect values of a given resource and hence its “relative price” for local 
populations (Ensminger 1996; Landolt and Haller 2015). This shift in relative 
price shapes the incentives of local actors who, in turn, may significantly modify 
local CPR institutions in response. According to this framework,  institutional 
410 Maurice Tschopp et al.
changes are not linear or automatic phenomena. Instead, Landolt and Haller 
emphasize that changes are negotiated, with outcomes depending “on actors’ bar-
gaining power and the ideologies they use to legitimize the institutional design” 
(Landolt and Haller 2015, 101). Ensminger’s approach to institutional change was 
further developed into the constitutionality approach to explain how local actors 
can foster the creation of new institutions, or, put differently, can participate in 
“bottom-up institution-building processes.” (Haller et al. 2015, 68). Haller and 
colleagues stress that negotiating a new set of rules anchored in local tradition 
requires specific conditions. While multiple factors are identified, it is impor-
tant not to overlook strategic actions based on unevenly distributed interests and 
asymmetric power relations. It is therefore crucial to provide local actors with “a 
fair platform in a context of different bargaining power constellations” (Haller 
et al. 2015, 84). The role of the state or other facilitators such as NGOs is hence 
very important in order to assist the creation of such platforms, and might explain 
specific cases of success or failure of bottom-up institution-building processes. 
In this way, constitutionality illuminates how conflicts over resource manage-
ment lead to formalized compromises with collective benefits for most or even 
all actors (Knight 1992). 
4. Methods and data
For this study, cooperatives’ rules were coded following a format similar to the 
ADICO grammar proposed by Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom (Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 2009; Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010). It is a form of content 
analysis that has been used to analyse and compare multiple sets of rules (Basurto 
et al. 2009; Siddiki et al. 2011, 2012; Frantz et al. 2013). It makes it possible to 
distinguish between different types of institutional statements, labelling them as 
strategies, norms, and rules according to the elements of the grammar used in 
each case (Basurto et al. 2009). We used this format in order to compare different 
institutional statements and how they apply to the socio-ecological system.
The acronym ADICO refers to five subcomponents that may be applied 
when analysing an institutional statement: Attribute (A), Deontic (D), aIm (I), 
Condition (C), and Or else (O). The Attribute (A) is the individual or organization 
to which the institutional statement applies. The Deontic content (D) refers to the 
type of modal verb used in the statement. The aIm (I) describes particular actions 
or outcomes to which the deontic content is assigned. Finally, the Conditions (C) 
defines when, where, or how the aim is permitted, obligatory, or forbidden, while 
the Or else (O) refers to the sanction assigned for not following the rules. As 
noted by Basurto et al. (2009), the attribute element is often explicit and does not 
require special analysis. In our study, it consistently refers to the members of a 
cooperative. We therefore excluded this element from our analysis and proceeded 
with a simplified “DICO” grammar in order to focus on coding/analysis of the 
rules themselves.
The institutional statements/rules were provided by the cooperatives in our 
case study (ANAPQUI 2009; ACRA-CC et al. 2014). These rules are communi-
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cated to quinoa producers through workshops and production guides. We decided 
to focus on six production rules that were identified as most important in inter-
views. The rules are similar for all three cooperatives, but the authors engaged in a 
reformulation and simplification of the rules for the purpose of this research. Some 
of the rules correspond to international production standards imposed by labels 
and monitored by regulatory/certification agencies (such as BOLICERT), while 
others were independently developed by cooperatives in response to sustainabil-
ity problems related to quinoa production (rules on llama herding and “barreras 
vivas”). While not exhaustive, we believe our analysis covers most of the crucial 
production rules followed by cooperative members in the region. Finally, we were 
also interested in whether or to what extent these production rules are enforced 
and respected by individual producers. The question of compliance is central in 
the literature on the commons, but has (surprisingly) not been studied as much as 
other aspects of the IAD framework (Siddiki et al. 2012). Producer compliance 
was evaluated through quantitative data collected in 2015, in combination with 
insights from focus group discussions and interviews with more than 60 produc-
ers and members of cooperatives, including technicians and other stakeholders 
(NGOs, government representatives). We assigned compliance scores based on 
the number of cooperative members following a given rule. All of these scores 
are best estimates: some rely on quantitative data, while others derive from inter-
views and focus group discussions. The latter are indicated with an asterisk (*). 
Quantitative data was collected via a survey conducted to generate baseline data 
for the FATE project (Feminization, Agrarian Transition and rural Employment),2
 
which investigates the effect of export-led agriculture on local livelihoods, rural 
labour markets, and gender relations at the community and household level. A 
total of 305 households were included in the survey, covering topics such as rural 
employment and household livelihoods as well as agricultural decisions and 
changing agricultural practices related to the quinoa boom. Most of the people 
responding to the survey were members of the cooperatives SOPROQUI (64%) or 
ARPAIAMT (28%), while 1% of respondents belonged to CECAOT and 7% did 
not belong to any cooperative. The degree of compliance with the rules presented 
does not represent nor replace formal compliance assessments conducted by other 
monitoring agencies.
5. Results and analysis
5.1. The role of cooperatives and rules enforcement
Table 3 presents the six rules for quinoa production at the centre of our analysis. 
The following section discusses both the impact of these rules and the factors 
influencing estimated compliance with the rules.
2
 FATE is a six-year research project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation.
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5.1.1. Rules on organic production
According to our analysis, rules on organic production were the most readily com-
plied with by cooperative members. These rules are clearly formulated, possess 
strong deontic elements, and stipulate a clear system of sanctions. Hence, produc-
ers have a direct interest in complying with these rules. If they are not met, the 
quinoa is labelled as “conventional”, which results in a significant loss of income. 
For example, prices at the end of 2016 were around 700 Bolivianos (approxi-
mately USD 100) per quintal (46 kg) for cooperatives belonging to ANAPQUI, 
compared to just over 300 Bolivianos per quintal for conventional quinoa.
Various analyses of the quinoa boom show that the resulting agricultural 
expansion shifted production from mountainous areas to the plains (Jacobsen 
2011; Vieira Pak 2012; Winkel et al. 2015). While this spatial shift was directly 
linked to the mechanization of quinoa production, it had the effect of exposing 
quinoa to increased harm from pests (Orsag et al. 2013). In these conditions, 
organic production requires careful attention, investment of time, and regular 
presence in the fields and in the community. These requirements are considered 
incompatible with the practices of certain more recent – and less experienced – 
producers (the residentes) who spend a minimum amount of time in their com-
munity (Carimentrand 2008; Vieira Pak 2012; Kerssen 2015). The cooperatives 
came up with several strategies to ensure that cooperative members would not be 
tempted to use chemicals as a result of major pest invasions. First, they developed 
incentives and reinforced workshops in local communities in order to enhance 
people’s know-how regarding preventive measures. Further, the cooperatives 
engaged in several collective actions at the community level and multiplied con-
trols in the last three years. In 2016, a systematic inspection campaign was carried 
out on behalf of ANAPQUI; responsible officials of SOPROQUI mentioned in 
interviews that these campaigns were meant to reduce or eliminate use of chem-
ical pesticides. The impact of these rules on CPR systems appeared relatively 
minimal; interviews suggested that pesticide contamination was considered less 
important than other challenges such as the extension of cultivation land and the 
decline of llama herding in the region. However, these two challenges are at least 
partly addressed by other production rules. 
5.1.2. Rules on land
Compliance appeared high with rules limiting the area size eligible for cultivation 
by a single household. These rules were perceived as having helped control the 
surge in agricultural land by protecting certain non-cultivated areas and ensuring 
minimum amounts of fallow land during the quinoa boom. The boom signifi-
cantly increased pressures on land across the region, and the number of hectares 
cultivated by each household rose considerably. Results from our survey showed 
that the average number of hectares cultivated yearly went from 3.77 hectares per 
household in 2007 to more than 7 hectares per household during the agricultural 
cycle 2014/2015. At the same time, the number of producers increased in many 
communities. Of those surveyed who increased the amount of land they culti-
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vated, 31% stated they did so by acquiring additional communal land, while 25% 
increased their production area by reducing fallow periods. Indeed, the quinoa 
boom provided strong incentives for quinoa producers to extend their cultiva-
tion and ignore community norms, thereby weakening the position of traditional 
authorities in charge of regulating access to land. Extension of agricultural fron-
tiers appears to have an important impact on socio-ecological systems (Winkel 
et al. 2016), such that strict rules are crucial regarding the amount of land a house-
hold may cultivate. The cooperatives’ rules limiting access to land appear to have 
benefitted the local CPR system as a whole and not just the production of organic 
quinoa. 
5.1.3. Rules on llama herding and barreras vivas
At the time of this study, compliance appeared to be low with respect to rules on 
minimum number of livestock and maintenance of natural barriers to address soil 
erosion. Two key factors may explain this lack of compliance relative to other 
rules. Because of the high prices of quinoa and lack of precise limits on cultivable 
land, producers who maintain natural vegetation barriers are at risk of losing the 
affected land if neighbours plough it and thus stake a claim on it. Furthermore, 
the rule on owning a minimum number of llamas is not systematically respected 
by cooperative members due to lack of clarity and enforcement. Some producers 
perceive the rule as unfair, especially in cases where cooperative members also 
engage in off-farm employment outside the community. As a result, the general 
conditions under which this rule applies remain unclear and cooperatives rarely 
sanction producers who fail to comply. One reason for this may be that the coop-
eratives view enforcement of this rule as the responsibility of traditional authori-
ties. Recently, however, cooperatives have begun to foster closer collaboration 
with traditional authorities to further develop and implement such rules aiming 
at preservation of socio-ecological systems. In this case, the cooperatives’ show 
a relatively high level of interaction with the traditional CPR system embodied 
by traditional authorities, although compliance with the relevant rules could be 
improved.
5.2. The impact of the quinoa boom (2007–2014) on the rules of 
cooperatives 
In previous sections, we argued that the quinoa boom provided strong financial 
incentives capable of weakening traditional norms and authorities. Interestingly, 
however, our data suggest that the stronger position of the cooperatives – com-
pared with traditional authorities – actually served to strengthen the local resource 
governance system as a whole seen from the perspective of sustainability. The inte-
gration of cooperatives into global value chains provided an important advantage 
for local actors who could benefit from improved market access (Carimentrand 
2008; Laguna 2011). Indeed, the cooperatives benefited from their direct con-
nection to international buyers, in contrast to newer independent producers who 
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had to sell their goods via intermediaries. On the other hand, the volatile market 
prices for quinoa had a detrimental effect on compliance with certain coopera-
tive rules. Major price fluctuations between 2010 and 2014 created situations in 
which conventional quinoa could actually be sold at higher prices than organic 
quinoa, reducing people’s incentives to respect strict organic production rules. In 
addition, some producers noted that these peaks encouraged greed among farm-
ers. Barreras vivas (living barriers) and fallow land were often ploughed under 
to gain extra surface area for quinoa fields. In those years where quinoa prices 
were at their highest (between 2010 and 2013), some cooperatives struggled to 
buy the total quinoa output for resale, as their financial reserves were significantly 
reduced. Uncertainty over the ability of cooperatives to buy all the quinoa harmed 
both the credibility of the cooperatives and the willingness of certain producers to 
respect the rules of organic production. 
6. Discussion
6.1. Assessment and discussion of the local governance system as a whole
Our analysis of cooperatives acting as a regulator of CPR via production rules dif-
fers from the usual perspective found in the literature, in which individual institu-
tions are represented as accountable for the exploitation of individual resources. 
As shown in our analysis, the southern Altiplano is characterized by multiple cen-
tres of power and land governance is regulated through diverse types of rules 
and authorities (Argandoña Espinoza 2016; Winkel et al. 2016). We focused our 
analysis on cooperative rules, but the efficacy of these rules must be placed in a 
broader framework that includes possible collaboration with other types of actors. 
The guiding question of this section is whether the polycentric system and espe-
cially the participation of cooperatives may be considered sustainable and insti-
tutionally robust. We analysed the rules of the cooperatives and their differential 
compliance vis-à-vis Ostrom’s eight design principles in order to examine the role 
of cooperatives in the broader resource governance system, to evaluate their abil-
ity to collaborate with and strengthen traditional authorities, and to explore how 
this might affect the sustainability potentials of local governance as a whole. This 
evaluation makes it possible to highlight the role of cooperatives in a complex 
governance system, while also drawing attention to potential limits of this poly-
centric governance system for the sustainable governance of natural resources. In 
Table 4 below, we present the empirical situation regarding each of the principles. 
6.2. Discussion of selected key principles
Table 4 presents a summary of the eight principles, and the empirical findings 
from our case study that apply to each principle. Five principles appear particu-
larly relevant for our case study and will be detailed in the following section. 
We have chosen to discuss these selected principles in greater depth for two rea-
sons: First, they illustrate the tensions and challenges that can exist in this specific 
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Table 4: Application of Ostrom’s eight principles to our case study.
Principle no.  Empirical findings 
1. Clearly defined boundaries  The principle of boundaries presents challenges within our case study, 
both with regard to the precise boundaries of quinoa fields, which is a 
major area of contention, and to membership in cooperatives.
2. Congruence between the 
appropriation and provision 
rule and local conditions
 The principle of congruence is not completely respected in our case 
study because of generality and uniformity of cooperative rules versus 
the specificity and diversity of local conditions.
3. Collective choice 
arrangements
 This condition is completely respected, as all the cooperatives fulfil the 
major democratic requirements typically associated with sustainable 
governance of natural resources. Participation in the general assemblies 
is mandatory (though not necessarily respected by all members) and 
each cooperative elects a new team of leaders every two years. Thus, 
every member of the cooperative is eligible to become president or 
vice president and there is some rotation between the main villages and 
regions in terms of representation on the board of directors.
4. Monitoring (monitors are 
present and accountable)
 This principle generally applies to our case study, but several 
problems were identified. The monitoring activities appear to be well 
in place. With respect to SOPROQUI and ARPAIAMT (two regional 
cooperatives of ANAPQUI), a system of monitoring and sanctions 
exists that is run by the semi-independent organization PROQUINAT. 
Technicians are members of this latter institution and thus do not 
depend directly on the president of the local cooperatives. In addition, 
all quinoa producers from these cooperatives can potentially be 
monitored by independent inspection agencies and certifiers.
5. Graduated sanctions  This principle applies to our case study, but not for all rules. Table 3 
summarizes the different systems of sanctions in place to punish non-
compliance with the rules of the cooperatives. One major challenge 
is that certain violations are not backed up by systematic sanctions. 
Currently, emphasis is placed on organic and fair trade rules, and less 
on rules such as llama keeping or land limits.
6. Conflict-resolution 
mechanisms 
 This principle applies to our case study, but conflicts often extend 
beyond the circle of cooperative members.
Cooperatives provide for various types of conflict-resolution 
mechanisms and help to resolve conflicts between different members.
7. Minimum recognition of 
rights to organize
 There are no factors constraining the self-organization of cooperatives.
8. Nested enterprises  Cooperatives are multilevel actors that operate both at the very local 
level (communities, villages) as well as at the national and international 
levels via the value chains with which cooperatives are linked.
governance system; second, they illustrate interesting opportunities that can arise 
from the interaction between traditional authorities and cooperatives. 
6.2.1. Clearly defined boundaries
The first principle may be divided into two elements: well-defined boundaries of 
the resource exploited, and well-defined user groups that benefit from the specific 
resource (Cox et al. 2010). In our case, challenges were evident regarding both 
of these elements. Resource boundaries were often unclear and lack of  precise 
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boundaries between farmers’ quinoa fields was identified as a source of conflict 
within communities (Vieira Pak 2012). Further, in many cases, the user groups 
benefiting from resources were also unclear. Membership in cooperatives is not 
universal; in many communities, the absence of broad membership restricts the 
ability of cooperatives to set rules that affect socio-ecological systems as a whole. 
Other community members’ access to land and cultivation of quinoa can vary 
significantly from year to year, and the quinoa boom resulted in significant in-
migration into small communities (Kerssen 2015), further blurring the boundaries 
between land users. Finally, in many cases, one could argue that membership in 
a cooperative need not contradict maintaining a formal role in traditional authori-
ties. Hence, land users could participate in and respect both governance systems – 
cooperative and traditional – and there is scope for greater collaboration between 
the two regarding the principle of clear boundaries.
At the same time, the suitability of this principle has been debated in the 
literature on governance of socio-ecological systems. Several authors argue that 
the principle of boundaries might not be needed to guarantee sustainable man-
agement of socio-ecological systems (see, for example, Turner 1999; Agrawal 
2001; Blaikie 2006). Often, the concept of boundaries does not apply to specific 
groups of users, such as pastoralist groups or communities that have undefined 
or fluctuating membership. Lack of universal membership echoes reflections on 
community homogeneity that is sometimes regarded as an artefact in the literature 
(Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Hence, lack of universal membership in coopera-
tives might not represent a major problem. Indeed, we follow Quinn et al. (2007) 
in arguing that the lack of clear boundaries has not necessarily resulted in weak 
management of natural resources in our case study. 
6.2.2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions
Similar to the boundary principle, the principle of congruence is often split into 
two distinct parts: a) congruence between local conditions and rules, and b) con-
gruence with local conditions (Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010; McGinnis 2011). 
Nevertheless, neither of these distinct views of congruence fully applies to 
resource governance by cooperatives. While cooperative rules can help to reduce 
pressure on land, the motivations behind them largely reflect the aim of capturing 
additional benefits from the quinoa value chain by means of internationally recog-
nized fair trade certifications (see Laguna 2003). Our interviews indicated that the 
rules were not developed to ensure the sustainable use of natural resources (e.g. 
land) per se. Further, the rules were developed at the national and/or subnational 
level, and, as such, do not precisely reflect the specific local conditions of natural 
resource use in each community. The relevant communities are characterized by a 
wide range of socio-ecological conditions including diverse soil types, land types 
(hills or plains), and quantities of land available per producer. A strict rule such as 
10 hectares of cultivated land per producer has very little relevance in communities 
already characterized by high degrees of pressure on land. 
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Nevertheless, our results suggest that cooperatives’ rules and the interac-
tion between cooperatives and traditional CPR institutions contributed to better 
management of community land and natural resources when they were associ-
ated with strong community norms. Further, there appeared to be fewer conflicts 
over land limits in villages and communities with higher levels of membership in 
cooperatives. Notably, traditional community authorities in cooperative areas also 
appeared to be more aware of local requirements and more likely to request that 
community members cultivate specific zones each year. Problems of congruence 
between cooperative rules and local conditions might be less important than we 
would assume based on Ostrom’s model. It may be better to consider cooperative 
and traditional governance systems as complementary, not mutually exclusive or 
competing.
6.2.3. Collective choice arrangements
High degrees of participation in assemblies and workshops among quinoa farm-
ers appeared to be linked to specific requirements placed on producers wishing 
to remain part of cooperatives. Regular meetings can greatly enhance the proper 
management of natural resources in several indirect ways. Through the meetings, 
quinoa producers were exposed to discourses on natural resource management, 
and awareness was raised about potential risks. Further, the meetings increased 
people’s capacity to mitigate risks, and built trust and healthy communication 
between producers, managers, and technicians from the cooperatives as well as 
between producers themselves. Trust has been shown to be a key element that 
contributes to overcoming prisoner-dilemma type situations. Communication is 
another central element that contributes to safeguarding CPRs (see, for instance, 
Ostrom et al. 1994; Adams et al. 2003; Cardenas et al. 2004; Laerhoven 2010). 
Finally, we note that the cooperative SOPROQUI invested significant time and 
energy in the organization of regular meetings between its members and the 
management.
6.2.4. Conflict-resolution mechanisms and relations with traditional 
authority systems
Cooperatives offer various types of conflict-resolution mechanisms. They help 
resolve conflicts between their members, and they often work together with tra-
ditional authorities in the event of conflicts between cooperative members and 
non-members. Both systems must contend with a high number of conflicts in 
the region. In our survey, 35% of 305 households said they were involved in 
a land use conflict currently or in recent years, a phenomenon that appears to 
have increased during the quinoa boom. Many of the conflicts involved commu-
nity members who recently returned and sought to benefit from the boom. These 
returns are evidenced by the 2002 and 2012 censuses, which reveal significant 
population increases in rural communities over this period (INE 2012). This has 
led some researchers to posit the possibility of “re-peasantization” among rural 
communities in the area (Kerssen 2015; see also van der Ploeg 2014). However, 
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most of these new residents pursue one or more professional activities in urban 
centres in addition to producing quinoa (Winkel et al. 2015). Their lack of partici-
pation in community assemblies and their tendency to convert community land to 
quinoa fields attracted criticism from other community members.
Recent work on the development of community norms has sought to reduce 
conflicts and mitigate the consequences of the quinoa boom. Many of these 
norms have been developed jointly by community authorities and NGOs (Felix 
2008). Enforcement of these community norms, however, is seen as a challenge 
(Argandoña Espinoza 2016; Winkel et al. 2016). Community members often 
harshly judge the ability of traditional authorities to enforce community norms 
effectively. Several reasons may explain their lack of effectiveness. First, commu-
nity norms are not necessarily backed up by state laws. Thus, it is not possible to 
appeal to anyone outside the community to enforce them. Second, in the absence 
of external legal jurisdiction, rule enforcement depends exclusively on the actions 
and abilities of those individuals who assume the cargos (position) with respect to 
rules enforcement. These abilities vary significantly from one person to another, 
making rule enforcement appear quite arbitrary. Finally, in settings where many 
community members bear ties of family or friendship, the impartiality of commu-
nity authorities is often questioned by those charged with violating norms. 
Our survey also revealed a relatively high percentage of distrust among com-
munity members towards traditional authorities. Only 51% of respondents said 
they trusted local authorities (see Figure 3). However, this finding should be kept 
in perspective: in this rural context, people generally display distrust towards vari-
ous authorities including state institutions. Indeed, almost two-thirds of the pro-
ducers interviewed expressed distrust towards the municipal government and the 
central government. Approximately 55% of respondents voiced trust of farmer 
cooperatives, the highest score. Nevertheless, it remains puzzling why trust would 
generally be this low in all of these institutions/authorities. It may be a result of 
these institutions inability to enforce certain norms – but more research would 
be needed to develop this understanding further. Overall, the complementarity 
between traditional authorities and productive organizations embodied by coop-
eratives remains important, and it might explain the high level of participation of 
cooperatives in institution-building processes.
6.3. Cooperative rules as a bottom-up institution-building process
In the present article, we conceptualized cooperatives as a local institution that 
established a set of rules before and during the quinoa boom. In this way, coop-
eratives may be considered part of a broader polycentric system of institutions 
that function well and serve to connect local producers with international buyers, 
while collaborating with traditional authorities. The established rules reflect both 
requirements of international buyers and, to a lesser extent, the local conditions 
of the resource setting.
The question arises as to whether the development of cooperatives and their 
rules are an example of bottom-up institution-building consistent with the concept 
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Figure 3: Levels of trust of household heads towards various authorities in our study region.
Table 5: Components of constitutionality identified by Haller et al. (2015).
Components of constitutionality 
identified by Haller et al. (2015)
 Application of component to the present case study
Emic perception of factors 
creating need for new institutions
 Condition fulfilled. The creation of cooperatives was 
motivated both by producers’ desire for access to new 
export markets and by their perception of potential benefits 
of certified quinoa production, which is easier to facilitate 
via cooperatives 
Participatory processes 
addressing power asymmetries
 Condition fulfilled. As described in previous sections, 
the social dimension of cooperatives make them highly 
participative 
Outside catalysing agents (fair 
platform)
 Condition fulfilled. International NGOs had important 
influence on the development of certain cooperatives, 
including CECAOT. Although relatively absent from 
the study area, the current participation of the Bolivian 
state in programmes that support the role of cooperatives 
(including through the development of a denomination of 
origin label) is encouraging and has created a fair platform 
for the consolidation of local institutions. 
Recognition of local knowledge 
of resources, creativity, and social 
learning to address new problems
 Condition fulfilled. Farmers’ knowledge is highly 
recognized by the institutions in place and valued by the 
cooperatives 
Higher level recognition, support, 
and subsidiarity vs. elite capture
 Condition fulfilled. As indicated previously, this criterion is 
similar to the principle of nested enterprise of Ostrom
of constitutionality (Haller et al. 2015). Despite being market-driven, the coopera-
tives indeed match the criteria identified by Haller et al. (2015), as seen in Table 5. 
The cooperatives in our study represent empowered actors that have established 
rules according to their own perspective, albeit with support from external actors. 
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Indeed, the first cooperatives were built with the support of NGOs, and there has 
been important technical cooperation between the most important Bolivian coop-
eratives and several international actors over the years (Carimentrand et al. 2014). 
The Bolivian state has not been very present in the region historically (Laguna 
2011).
In addition, the recent consequences of price fluctuations highlight the role of 
power struggles within the constitutionality process (Haller et al. 2015). Indeed, 
the quinoa boom demonstrated how price fluctuations could redefine the posi-
tion of traditional authorities and cooperatives. Traditional authorities appeared 
to be weakened as a result of their inability to address price-related challenges, 
although the trajectories in different communities were very diverse. Overall, 
our interviews suggest that the price fluctuations, while creating a “generalized 
chaos”, ultimately reinforced certain local CPR institutions. In many communi-
ties, cooperatives helped to fill gaps left unaddressed by traditional authorities. 
New strategies, monitoring, and sanction systems were developed to negotiate 
changing price incentives. As such, this case study presents a good example of 
institutional change and bottom-up institution-building processes.
7. Conclusion
In this article, we showed that in a context characterized by general uncertainty 
over community prerogatives and land boundaries settings as well as lack of 
enforceable sanctions for certain types of rules, farmer cooperatives played an 
important role in establishing rules to reduce pressures on natural resources. 
Our analysis of cooperatives acting as a regulator of CPR via production rules 
differs from a conventional perspective in which a single institution is represented 
as accountable for the exploitation of a specific resource. Farmer cooperatives 
are multilevel actors both at the local level (communities, villages) as well as at 
national and international levels via the value chains in which they operate. At the 
local level, cooperatives are just one – albeit important – element of a complex 
polycentric resource governance, and their role cannot be understood without 
accounting for other actors in the system. They benefit from the complementary 
support of strong community authorities, with clear legal recognition, which are 
capable of resolving conflicts in their own communities. Our analysis of coopera-
tives in a particular CPR governance through the lens of Ostrom’s eight design 
principles hence highlights the importance of complementarity between two dif-
ferent types of institutions.
At the same time, cooperatives face challenges including (in)congruence with 
some local resources. The potential of some rules is not completely fulfilled, as evi-
denced by the low compliance rates with certain rules (such as “barreras vivas”). 
As one out of many institutional actors participating in a complex resource-gov-
ernance system, farmer cooperatives contribute to sustainable resource manage-
ment without completely replacing functions of traditional authorities. In our case 
study, cooperatives reduced some of the negative consequences of the quinoa 
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boom, a period when traditional authorities were acutely challenged by high lev-
els of pressure on land resources. 
Our research framed cooperatives as part of a polycentric system. While the 
sustainability of agricultural production is presented as a challenge in many con-
texts, the potential of cooperatives has to be recognized, including by policy-
makers. In particular, the opportunity of the collaboration between cooperatives, 
traditional authorities with a small degree of involvement of the central state 
could potentially be further explored and might present important opportunities 
for decentralised natural resource governance. This kind of collaboration offers 
interesting examples of potential avenues for future research, but also to some 
degree for policy makers. As such, the involvement of all these actors in efforts 
towards the development of a geographic label of origin for quinoa from the 
southern Altiplano indicates that the Bolivian State recognizes cooperatives as 
important partners. Further, the inclusion of cooperatives in the label negotiation 
processes, alongside municipal authorities and private companies, suggests that 
the Bolivian state not only acknowledges the legitimacy of polycentric gover-
nance, but actively builds on it. This recognition bodes well for further develop-
ing the cooperation between different actors of a complex governance system. 
Against the background of the dynamics in quinoa – the former boom and subse-
quent bust – and their critical consequences, political strategies to incentivise and 
fine-tune the cooperation between these different institutions need to be forged. 
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